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Abstract 
This paper examines whether the Mortensen-Pissarides matching model can account 
for the housing market facts, most of all the empirical anomaly known as ‘price 
dispersion’. Our main finding is that the model can account for the three basic facts of 
housing market (namely, the existence of price dispersion, the positive correlation 
between housing price and trading volume, and between housing price and time-on-
the market), without any restrictive assumption and in a very simple framework. 
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1. Introduction 
Housing markets are characterized by a decentralized framework of exchange with 
important search and matching frictions. It has, in fact, been acknowledged that 
housing markets clear not only through price but also through the time and money 
that a buyer and a seller spend on the market. Consequently, the search and matching 
approach is widely used even in this type of market (see section 2). Furthermore, three 
basic facts have been repeatedly reported: (a) the positive correlation between 
housing price and trading volume (see Leung, Lau and Leong, 2002; Fisher et al., 2003, 
among others); (b) the positive correlation between housing price and the time-on-the 
market (see Leung, Leong and Chan, 2002; Anglin et al. 2003; Merlo and Ortalo-Magne, 
2004; Leung and Zhang, 2011, among others);
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 and (c) the existence of price 
dispersion. The latter is probably the most important distinctive feature of housing 
markets. Price dispersion (or price volatility) refers to the phenomenon of selling two 
houses with very similar attributes and in near locations at the same time but at very 
different prices. Although price dispersion research is more commonly found in studies 
of non-durable consumption goods,
2
 price dispersion studies on durable and re-
saleable goods such as real estate are also growing rapidly (see e.g. Read, 1991; 
Gabriel et al., 1992; Baharad and Eden, 2004; Leung, Leong and Wong, 2006; Yiu, Hui, 
and Wong, 2005; Yiu, Tam, and Lee, 2006; Wong, Yiu, Tse, and Chau, 2006; Wong, Yiu, 
and Chau, 2007; Yiu, Man, and Wong, 2008). Real estate is in fact the most important 
durable consumption good and one of the most important assets for most household 
portfolios (Leung, Leong and Wong, 2006). Since most transactions of real estate come 
from re-sales between individual buyers and sellers (transactions in the housing 
markets are in fact dominated by a second-hand market), it should not be surprising 
that price dispersion exists in the housing market (Leung, Leong and Wong, 2006). 
Basically, the variance in house prices cannot be attributed completely to the 
heterogeneous nature of real estate. In fact, a significant part of house price dispersion 
is basically due to the ex-ante heterogeneity of buyers and sellers (bargaining power, 
tastes, patience rate, asymmetric information, etc.) and their sustained search costs. 
                                                 
1
 The time it takes to sell a property, the so-called time-on-market (TOM), measures the degree of 
illiquidity of the real estate asset and is a fundamental characteristic differentiating real estate from 
financial assets. 
2
 A detailed literature review on price dispersion can be found in Baye et al. (2006). 
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Sellers and buyers spend time and money – for advertising vacancies and making the 
effort to visit the greatest number of houses – before concluding the deal. Moreover, 
the bargaining power of the parties plays a key role in the formation process of 
housing prices (Quan and Quigley, 1991; Habito et al., 2010; Harding et al., 2003a; 
Harding et al., 2003b; Cotteleer and Gardebroek, 2006). These factors affect the selling 
price and lead to price dispersion, since for different bargaining powers and search 
costs the selling price will be different. 
The main aim of this paper is to develop a search and matching model à la Mortensen-
Pissarides (see e.g. Pissarides, 2000) that explains the basic facts of housing markets. In 
particular, we develop a decentralised long-run equilibrium model with ex-ante 
heterogeneous buyers and sellers, based on both the bargaining and the costly search 
activity that characterises the housing market. The proposed work takes the distinctive 
features of the considered market into account, where the formal distinction between 
buyer and seller becomes very subtle. In the model, in fact, a seller can become a 
buyer and vice versa. Indeed, most houses are bought by those who already own one, 
and most houses are sold by those wanting to buy another house (Janssen et al., 
1994); buyers today are in fact potential sellers tomorrow (Leung, Leong and Wong, 
2006). 
In this model, price dispersion comes from two sources: first, the bargaining power of 
the parties, since different bargaining powers lead to different selling prices for two 
similar houses; second, the search costs of sellers and buyers, since the ex-ante 
heterogeneity of the parties implies different search costs and thus individuals obtain 
different values from a conclusive transaction. Furthermore, this simple theoretical 
model is also able to explain two other well-known empirical regularities, namely the 
positive correlation between housing price and trading volume, and between housing 
price and the time-on-the-market. Hence, this paper clearly shows that the behaviour 
of the housing market (reflected in the above empirical findings) can be addressed 
adequately by the standard matching framework à la Mortensen-Pissarides. 
Finally, the model with bargaining and search costs allows to overcome a major 
drawback of the standard hedonic pricing theory (Rosen, 1974): the assumption of 
competitive markets (Harding et al., 2003a; Harding et al., 2003b; Cotteleer and 
Gardebroek, 2006). Indeed, in the standard hedonic pricing theory, markets are 
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assumed to be sufficiently thick (i.e. markets with a large amount of trading) that 
implicit or hedonic prices, i.e. the shadow prices of the characteristics, are revealed to 
economic agents through trades that differ only in terms of a single attribute. The 
house price is then given by the linear or non-linear combination of hedonic prices and 
housing characteristics. Hence, bargaining has no impact on price because the hedonic 
prices are well defined and are known to both buyers and sellers. In short, as long as 
markets are sufficiently thick, market participants can determine the implicit or 
hedonic prices and the “true” market value of the good is well known. However, this is 
hardly true: markets become increasingly thin when traded goods are increasingly 
heterogeneous, and the implicit or hedonic prices as well as the "true" market value of 
the good are not known. In the limit, each trade becomes unique and market 
participants may take part only in a single trade. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: section 2 briefly reviews the literature 
which makes use of the search and matching models to study the housing market; 
section 3 presents the housing market matching model; while section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Literature review 
This paper belongs to the recent and growing literature that use search and matching 
models to explain the behaviour of housing markets. The first search model of housing 
market is Wheaton (1990); since then several papers have developed models to 
analyze the formation process of prices in housing markets with 
search/matching/trading frictions (see table 1 for a summary). 
========== Table 1 about here now at the end ========== 
Usually, papers in this literature assume that search is random, as opposed to directed, 
and house prices are often determined by Nash bargaining. In some of these papers, 
an aggregate matching function together with market tightness plays a key role. This is 
in line with the standard matching framework (see the textbook by Pissarides, 2000). 
Among this literature, this model is most related to that of Leung and Zhang (2011), 
since it aims to explain the basic facts of housing market by using a basic Mortensen-
Pissarides matching model. As in Leung and Zhang (2011), a necessary condition for 
explaining these housing market facts is the heterogeneity on the seller's and/or the 
buyer's side, which generates corresponding submarkets. In particular, Leung and 
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Zhang (2011) focus on one-side heterogeneity and assume that sellers are different in 
terms of their waiting costs for selling the house, where buyers are free to enter either 
submarket.
3
 However, in our model the free-entry or zero-profit condition for sellers à 
la Pissarides, rather than the buyer's free entry assumption used by Leung and Zhang 
(2011), allows to obtain a solution which characterises the direct relationship between 
market tightness and house price. In Leung and Zhang (2011), the equilibrium is in fact 
determined by a system of three equations in three unknowns where the endogenous 
variables – the value of seller, the value of buyer and the house price – depend on 
market tightness. Indeed, with a fixed entry value for the buyers and a fixed number of 
sellers, they first solve the market tightness, and then the (buyer and seller) values and 
the house price. 
 
3. A Baseline Matching Model of Housing Market 
3.1 The hypotheses of the model 
We adopt a standard matching framework à la Mortensen-Pissarides (see e.g. 
Pissarides, 2000) with random search and prices determined by Nash bargaining. The 
random matching assumption is absolutely compatible with a market where the formal 
distinction between the demand and supply side is very subtle; whereas, bargaining is 
a natural outcome of thin, local and decentralised markets for heterogeneous goods. 
Since we are interested in selling price, the market of reference is the homeownership 
market rather than the rental market. In this way, if a contract is legally binding (as 
hypothesised) it is no longer possible to return to the circumstances preceding the bill 
of sale, unless a new and distinct contractual relationship is set up. In matching model 
jargon this means that the destruction rate of a specific buyer-seller match does not 
exist. As a result, the value of an occupied home for a seller is simple given by the 
selling price. 
The economy is populated by N  types of sellers (which we indicate with N1,...,i = ) 
and by M  types of buyers (which we indicate with M1,...,j = ). “Type” refers to the 
economic rather than social or personal characteristics of the individual. We indicate 
with 
is  a measure of sellers of type i  and with jb  a measure of buyers of type j . 
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 Sellers with higher waiting costs (the so-called impatient or "fire-sale" sellers) are willing to accept 
lower prices, which attract a larger number of potential buyers so that the house would be sold faster. 
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Hence, we can think of ∑ = Ss
i
 and ∑ = Bb
i
 as measures of the stock of sellers and 
buyers in the economy, respectively. Sellers hold 2h ≥  houses of which 1h −  are on 
the market, i.e. vacancies ( v ) are simply given by ( ) 0S1hv >⋅−= , thus assuming a 
vacancy rate permanently positive (as in Wheaton, 1990). It is therefore possible that a 
buyer of type j  can become a seller of type i , and that a seller of type i  can become a 
buyer of type j .4 
The expected values of a vacant house (V ) and of buying a house ( H ) are given by: 5 
( ) [ ]VPθqarV i −⋅+−=                             [1] 
( ) [ ]PHxθgerH j −−⋅+−=                             [2] 
where 
B
v
θ ≡  is the housing market tightness from the sellers’ standpoint,6 while ( )θq  
and ( )θg  are, respectively, the (instantaneous) probability of filling a vacant house and 
of finding/buying a home. The popular hypothesis of constant returns to scale in the 
matching function, { }Bv,mm = , is adopted (see Pissarides, 2000; Petrongolo and 
Pissarides, 2001). Hence, the properties of these functions are straightforward: 
( ) 0θq' <  and ( ) 0θg' > .7 The terms ia  and je  represent, respectively, the costs 
sustained by sellers of type i  for the advertisement of vacancies and the effort (in 
monetary terms) made by buyers of type j  to find and visit the largest possible 
number of houses. If a contract is stipulated, the buyer of type j  gets a benefit x  from 
the property (abandoning the home searching value) and pays the sale price P  to the 
seller of type i  (who abandons the value of finding another buyer). As usual, the 
buyer’s benefit x , i.e. the value of the house, is a positive function of housing 
characteristics; hence, x  does not depend on the buyer’s type.8 
                                                 
4
 Alternatively, one could assume that the sellers hold h ≥ 1 houses of which h are on the market, and 
the buyers are the homeless. This case would not change the results of the analysis. 
5
 Time is continuous and individuals are risk neutral, live infinitely and discount the future at the 
exogenous rate r . As usual in matching-type models, the analysis is restricted to the stationary state. 
6
 Leung and Zhang (2011) define the market tightness from a buyer perspective and the number of 
sellers is fixed. 
7
 Standard technical assumptions are assumed: ( ) ( ) ∞==
∞→→ θglimθqlim θ0θ , and 
( ) ( ) 0θqlimθglim θ0θ == ∞→→ . By definition, markets with frictions require positive and finite tightness, i.e. 
∞<< θ0 , since for 0=θ  the vacancies are always filled, whereas for ∞=θ  the home-seekers 
immediately find a vacant house. 
8
 As in Albrecht et al. (2007) and Leung and Zhang (2011), the value of the house is independent of 
agents' types. 
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3.2 Equilibrium 
In a housing market with frictions, the endogenous variables that are determined 
simultaneously at equilibrium are market tightness (θ ) and sale price ( P ). 
The customary long-term equilibrium condition, namely the “zero-profit” or “free-
entry” condition, normally used in the matching models (see Pissarides, 2000) yields 
the first key relationship of the model, in which market tensions are a positive function 
of price. In fact, using the condition 0V =  in [1], we obtain: 
( ) ( ) PaθqθqP
a i
i
=⋅⇒=
1
                [3] 
with 0
P
θ
>
∂
∂
, since ( ) 0θq' < . This positive relationship is very intuitive: in fact, if the 
price increases, more vacancies will be on the market. Note that there are several sub-
markets and each submarket has its tightness. As in Leung and Zhang (2011), the "sub-
markets" simply represent the trading which involves different type of agents. Thus, 
with ex-ante heterogeneity of agents and assuming complete and perfect information, 
we don't worry on the cross-market effects. 
The free-entry condition also implies a trade-off between the housing price and the 
speed of sales for the sellers. In fact, with an arrival rate of ( )θq , the expected time-
on-the-market (TOM) is the inverse function ( ) 1−θq . As a result, from [3] there is a 
positive correlation between housing prices and the time on the market, since a higher 
price takes a longer time to sell a house (as pointed by Leung, Leong and Chan, 2002; 
Anglin et al. 2003; Merlo and Ortalo-Magne, 2004; Leung and Zhang, 2011). 
The (generalised) Nash bargaining solution, usually used for decentralised markets, 
allows the sale price P  to be obtained through the optimal subdivision of surplus (S ) 
deriving from a successful match. The surplus is defined as the sum of the seller’s and 
buyer’s value when the trade takes place, net of the respective external options, i.e. 
the value of continuing to search:
 9
 
( ) ( )
43421321
buyer of gain  capitalseller of gain  capital
PHxVPS −−+−=  
HxS −=⇒                   [4] 
                                                 
9
 Entering into a contractual agreement obviously implies that 0S > , i.e. Hx > , θ∀ . This realistic 
condition ensures that the price is positive. 
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The price is obtained by solving the following optimisation condition (recall that in 
equilibrium 0V = , i ∀ ): 
( ) ( ){ }ii γ1γ PHxVP argmaxP −−−⋅−=  
( ) ( )PHxγ1
γ
P
i
i
−−⋅
−
= ( )HxγP i −⋅=⇒  
where 
iγ  is the bargaining power of sellers of type i . 
By using  the previous result ( ) ( ) P
γ
γ1
PHx
i
i
⋅
−
=−−  in equation [2], eventually we get: 
( )
( ) ( )i
ji
γ1θgr
erxγ
P
−⋅+
+⋅
=
                                                                 
[5] 
Equation [5] is none other than the hedonic price function of the model: in fact, the 
selling price depends positively on the buyer’s benefit x , which in turn depends 
positively on the housing characteristics. Hence, as suggested by the hedonic price 
theory, the selling price is a positive function of housing characteristics. 
Furthermore, since ( ) 0θg' > , as market tensions increase, the sale price decreases; 
hence, we obtain the second key relationship of the model: 0
θ
P
<
∂
∂
. In short, if the 
market tightness increases, the effect of the well-known congestion externalities on 
the demand side (see Pissarides, 2000) will lower the price. 
By combining the equations [3] and [5], this model is able to reproduce the observed 
joint behaviour of prices and time on the market: in fact, the house with a higher 
selling price has a longer time on the market (see equation (3)), but, ceteris paribus, 
the longer the time on the market the lower the sale price, since the expected time-
on-the-market ( ) 1−θq  is increasing in θ  (Krainer, 2001; Merlo and Ortalo-Magne, 2004; 
Leung and Zhang, 2011; Diaz and Jerez, 2009). 
Finally, it is straightforward to obtain from [3] that when P  tends to zero (infinity), θ  
tends to zero (infinity), as ( )θq  tends to infinity (zero). Consequently, given the 
negative slope of [5] and the fact that price is always positive, with intercept 
( )
( )i
ji
γ1r
erxγ
P
−+
+⋅
=→0limθ , only one long term equilibrium deriving from the intersection 
of the two curves exists in the model (see point A in Figure 1). 
========== Figure 1 about here (now at the end) ========== 
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3.3 Comparative statics and price dispersion 
From [5], the selling price crucially depends on the bargaining power of the seller. In 
fact, 0P0γ i =⇒→ , and 
r
e
xP1γ
j
i +=⇒→ . Since the price can never be negative 
or null, we assume that 1γ0 i ≤< . 
Furthermore, the selling price also depends on the search costs of buyers and sellers. 
In particular, from [5] it is straightforward to obtain that an increase in the search 
effort of buyers (
je ) increases the selling price. This is an intuitive result. However, a 
partially counter-intuitive result regards the effect of advertising vacancies on the 
selling price. In fact, an increase in 
ia  decreases market tightness, which in turn 
increases the selling price (see point A’ in Figure 2). In short, an increase in the seller’s 
search cost also leads to an increase in the selling price. 
========== Figure 2 about here (now at the end) ========== 
Intuitively, the trading volume for a given period is given by the matching rate (see 
Leung and Zhang, 2011). Although in this simple model the search costs of buyers and 
sellers are exogenous, it is straightforward to include them in the matching function, 
i.e. { }Bev,amm ji ⋅⋅=  . An increase in the search effort or advertising vacancies will 
increase the matching rate m . As a result, the model could also explain the positive 
relationship between housing price and trading volume, since an increase in the search 
costs of buyers and sellers increases both the selling price and the matching rate. This 
is in line with the empirical works of Fisher et al. (2003) and Leung, Lau and Leong 
(2002). 
Finally, we consider two similar houses, Y and Z, which give the same benefit: 
ZY xx = . 
In this case, price dispersion in the model comes from: 
a) The bargaining power of sellers (
iγ ): different bargaining powers lead to different 
selling price; 
b) The search costs of sellers (
ia ) and buyers ( je ): in fact, since matching occurs 
between a seller of type i  and a buyer of type j , different pairs lead to different 
search costs, which in turn imply different selling prices. 
The key determinant of price dispersion is in fact the heterogeneity in buyers and 
sellers incorporated in the formula of selling price. The housing price dispersion exists 
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as long as the heterogeneity enters the pricing formula, no matter how the prices are 
determined (Leung and Zhang, 2011). Vukina and Zheng (2010) find a very strong 
empirical support for the theoretical prediction that bargaining with search costs 
explains price dispersion in the agricultural market. 
 
3.4 Closing the model with the natural vacancy rate 
In order to find the “natural” vacancy rate – i.e. the optimal share of houses for sale on 
the market that prevails in long term equilibrium at which sellers make no economic 
profits (see Arnott and Igarashi, 2000; McDonald, 2000) – we normalise the population 
in the housing market to the unit, i.e. 1 = S + B. As a result, using the definitions of 
equilibrium tightness, 
B
v
θ*θ ≡= , and vacancies, ( ) S1hv ⋅−= , it straightforward to 
obtain the stock of sellers, buyers, and the “natural” vacancy rate: 
*θ1h
*θ
S
+−
=                  [6] 
*θ1h
1h
B
+−
−
=                  [7] 
( )
*θ1h
*θ1h
v
+−
⋅−
=                  [8] 
which have very intuitive properties: 0
*θ
S
>
∂
∂
, 0
*θ
B
<
∂
∂
, and 0
*θ
v
>
∂
∂
. 
 
3. Conclusions 
Housing markets are characterized by a decentralized framework of exchange with 
important search and matching frictions. Furthermore, three basic facts have been 
repeatedly reported by empirical studies: 1) the variance in house prices cannot be 
completely attributed to the heterogeneous nature of real estate and the residual 
volatility is empirically non negligible; 2) the (partially counter-intuitive) positive 
relationship between housing price and the number of contracts traded during a given 
period; 3) the trade-off between the housing price and the speed of sales for the 
sellers. This theoretical paper clearly shows that the behaviour of housing markets, 
reflected in the above empirical findings, can be addressed adequately by the standard 
matching framework à la Mortensen-Pissarides. 
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Figure 1. Equilibrium 
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Figure 2. Increase in the search costs of sellers (advertising vacancies) 
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ti
ve
 d
e
m
a
n
d
 s
h
o
ck
 l
e
a
d
s 
to
 s
h
o
rt
e
r 
se
ll
e
r 
ti
m
e
 o
n
 t
h
e
 
m
a
rk
e
t 
a
n
d
 f
e
w
e
r 
h
o
m
e
 v
is
it
s,
 
w
h
il
e
 b
u
y
e
r 
ti
m
e
 o
n
 t
h
e
 
m
a
rk
e
t 
is
 m
u
ch
 l
e
ss
 s
e
n
si
ti
v
e
 
Le
u
n
g
 a
n
d
 Z
h
a
n
g
 
(2
0
1
1
) 
to
 e
xp
la
in
 t
h
e
 t
h
re
e
 b
a
si
c 
fa
ct
s 
o
f 
h
o
u
si
n
g
 m
a
rk
e
t 
(p
ri
ce
 d
is
p
e
rs
io
n
, 
p
o
si
ti
v
e
 c
o
rr
e
la
ti
o
n
 
b
e
tw
e
e
n
 t
im
e
-o
n
-t
h
e
-
m
a
rk
e
t 
a
n
d
 p
ri
ce
s,
 a
n
d
 
b
e
tw
e
e
n
 p
ri
ce
s 
a
n
d
 
tr
a
d
in
g
 v
o
lu
m
e
) 
o
n
e
-s
id
e
 h
e
te
ro
g
e
n
e
it
y
 w
h
ic
h
 g
e
n
e
ra
te
s 
co
rr
e
sp
o
n
d
in
g
 s
u
b
m
a
rk
e
ts
: 
se
ll
e
rs
 a
re
 
d
if
fe
re
n
t 
in
 t
e
rm
s 
o
f 
th
e
ir
 w
a
it
in
g
 c
o
st
s 
fo
r 
se
ll
in
g
 t
h
e
 h
o
u
se
, 
w
h
e
re
 b
u
y
e
rs
 a
re
 
fr
e
e
 t
o
 e
n
te
r 
e
it
h
e
r 
su
b
m
a
rk
e
t 
N
a
sh
 b
a
rg
a
in
in
g
 
Y
e
s 
/r
a
n
d
o
m
 
th
e
 m
o
d
e
l 
is
 a
b
le
 t
o
 
re
p
ro
d
u
ce
 t
h
e
 t
h
re
e
 b
a
si
c 
fa
ct
s 
o
f 
h
o
u
si
n
g
 m
a
rk
e
t 
P
e
te
rs
o
n
 (
2
0
1
2
) 
to
 e
xp
la
in
 t
h
e
 b
e
h
a
vi
o
u
r 
o
f 
h
o
u
se
 p
ri
ce
s 
in
 t
h
e
 
U
n
it
e
d
 S
ta
te
s 
T
h
e
 m
o
d
e
l 
co
m
b
in
e
s 
se
a
rc
h
 f
ri
ct
io
n
s 
w
it
h
 
a
 b
e
h
a
vi
o
u
ra
l 
a
ss
u
m
p
ti
o
n
 w
h
e
re
 m
a
rk
e
t 
p
a
rt
ic
ip
a
n
ts
 i
n
co
rr
e
ct
ly
 b
e
li
e
v
e
 t
h
a
t 
th
e
 
e
ff
ic
ie
n
t 
m
a
rk
e
t 
th
e
o
ry
 h
o
ld
s 
(t
h
e
 s
o
-
ca
ll
e
d
 “
F
o
o
le
d
 b
y
 s
e
a
rc
h
”)
 
N
a
sh
 b
a
rg
a
in
in
g
 
Y
e
s 
/r
a
n
d
o
m
 
T
h
e
 m
o
d
e
l 
ca
n
 r
e
p
li
ca
te
 t
h
e
 
o
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
 t
h
a
t 
re
a
l 
p
ri
ce
 
g
ro
w
th
 a
n
d
 t
u
rn
o
ve
r 
a
re
 
h
ig
h
ly
 c
o
rr
e
la
te
d
, 
a
n
d
 i
t 
e
xp
la
in
in
g
 o
ve
r 
7
0
%
 o
f 
th
e
 h
o
u
si
n
g
 b
u
b
b
le
 i
n
 t
h
e
 
U
n
it
e
d
 S
ta
te
s 
    
